By Zain Abbas
Pakistan’s bureaucratic system, largely inherited from the colonial era, often struggles to meet modern governance needs, leading to inefficiencies that can appear as incompetence. Political interference further hampers performance, with appointments and promotions sometimes based on loyalty rather than merit, undermining accountability and professionalism.
The adage “absolute power corrupts absolutely” aptly describes the situation within Pakistan’s bureaucracy, where entrenched corruption distorts priorities away from the public’s needs towards personal gain. This has led to systemic dysfunction, with public perceptions growing increasingly negative.
Efforts at reform have aimed at boosting efficiency and transparency, yet issues like incompetence, political meddling, favoritism, nepotism, and excessive bureaucratic power remain pervasive, compromising Pakistan’s administrative structures.
This dysfunction reverberates through all subordinate bodies, resulting in significant challenges across all sectors. Often, bureaucrats shift blame to politicians, masking the fact that political decisions often require bureaucratic complicity.
Key institutions like WAPDA, Steel Mill, PIA, and Pakistan Railways illustrate the broader systemic failure. The Department of Plant Protection (DPP), under the Ministry of National Food Security and Research, serves as a microcosm of crumbling bureaucratic structure, despite its critical role in biosecurity and food safety.
Issues such as favoritism in appointments, regulatory missteps, and ignoring the need for a strong technical workforce at DPP exemplify bureaucratic mismanagement. The tactics employed seem to shift responsibility away from themselves toward technical officers, who ultimately bear the brunt of bureaucratic failings.
In the recent episode of 72 rice shipment interceptions in the EU due to pesticide residues (imidacloprid, acetamiprid, chlorpyrifos, thiamethoxam, tricyclozole,), aflatoxin, mineral oil (MOAH &MOSH), genetically modified organism (GMO) and red flour beetle insect, a bureaucrat abroad, Mr. Omer Hameed, incorrectly assigned blame to the DPP, despite their role is restricted to biosecurity and not extending to food safety.
The lack of awareness of Pakistan’s economic minister in Brussel ( Omer Hameed) is evident in several areas. He seems unaware that the Department of Plant Protection (DPP) does not regulate food safety risks and measures, which are instead managed by rice exporters themselves through the SGS private pre-shipment inspection company and private laboratories, as per a policy decision by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of National Food Security and Research during the PDM government since October 2022 when this issue emerged first time. He is also apparently oblivious to the fact that Pakistan Plant Quarantine Rules, 2019 do not address food safety issues and measures. Furthermore, since joining the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), which sets international food safety standards, Pakistan has failed to establish federal food safety regulations.
The minister does not seem to understand that plant health and human health are distinct, with plant health guided by the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and Pakistan Plant Quarantine Rules, 2019, whereas human health should be governed by CAC and no federal regulations at present to regulate it during trade. Currently, the responsibility for regulating food safety risks lies with the Ministry of National Health Services Regulation and Coordination (MoNHSR&C), led by Dr. Razia Safdar, the Codex focal point for Pakistan as per rules of business, yet there are no federal regulations to enforce these standards.
Moreover, the provincial food safety authorities in Pakistan — Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan Food Authorities — manage food safety within their jurisdictions, indicating that food safety is a provincial subject. The minister further fails to distinguish between biosecurity risks, which pertain to the DPP, and food safety risks, under the purview of MoNHSR&C, as well as biosafety risks like GMOs, overseen by the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency. Despite repeated requests, the Economic Minister and Ministry of Commerce (MoCom) have been unable to get a DPP official appointed as a Codex member for the EU since 2022. Since long, Dr. Razia Safdar, from Ministry of National Health Services Regulation and Coordination (MoNHSR&C), Islamabad, is designated Focal Point for Codex, thus, it is evident that MoNHSR&C is looking after affairs of the foods safety in international trade and Economic Minister should have sent these interceptions to MoNHSR&C instead of the DPP or MoNFS&R.
In Pakistan, food safety within the Capital Territory falls under the jurisdiction of the Secretary Interior and the Islamabad Commissioner. Unlike counterparts in the USA, Australia, and the EU foreign mission, Pakistan lacks technical representation in foreign missions to bolster agricultural exports, which has led to declining exports amidst biosecurity, food safety, and biosafety risks—distinct areas managed by separate ministries.
This incident highlights a lack of regulatory frameworks and miscommunication regarding departmental mandates, revealing a need for better integration and coherence between different regulatory roles.
Recently, the Prime Minister, in a typical display of showmanship, established a Joint Investigation Team to look into the DPP’s shortcomings concerning compliance with food safety standards, particularly the issue of rice shipments being intercepted in the EU on the cipher of the Pakistan’s Ambassador and Economic Minister letter to Premier without evaluating its consequences on the export of Pakistan after blaming the integrity Pakistan’s plant quarantine system not mandated for food safety. No one was in the office of the PM office to guide him that there were no food safety regulations at federal level and food safety falls within mandate of the MoNFS&R under rules of business and enquiry committee find responsible in (MoNHSR&C) and its attached departments. The team includes former and current bureaucrats, such as Shahid Khan, Rashid Mehmood Langrial, Shakeel Ahmed Mangnejo, Ali Tahir, Mr. Iftikhar Ali Sahoo, Mr. Rafique Ahmed Buriro, and others, along with representatives from the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Intelligence Bureau (IB). However, the committee lacks technical experts who could provide insight into these complex issues.
This investigation marks a global first: a non-technical bureaucratic panel is probing the technical incompetency reported and has raised questions over the DPP’s responsibilities and record-keeping, specifically regarding phytosanitary certification. Despite the limited resources—21 regular and 50 contractual specialists, compared to hundreds in countries like Iran and India, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam—the DPP staff labor under challenging conditions without adequate tools or facilities at any port (land terminals, international airports, seaports, dry ports, international railway station, etc.,) of Pakistan to manage plant quarantine and export inspections effectively. This year, Pakistan has exported rice worth USD 3.88 billion, ever highest in the history of Pakistan in the fiscal year 2023-2024 million to around 150 countries with certification of DPP. Major destinations include EU, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Russia, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, United States, & Canada based on the inspection and certification efforts of the DPP with just one interception of red flour beetle.
At Karachi ports, only six technical officers are responsible for inspecting numerous export consignments daily. While food safety isn’t typically within the DPP’s remit, the scant resources and procedural demands make comprehensive safety verification implausible. Exporters often resist delays for inspections, prompting the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of National Food Security and Research to allow lax self-regulated safety measures. Still, the bureaucratic committee seems intent on attributing blame to DPP officials, ignoring systemic issues and the logistical realities faced. Even major nations like USA, China, India, Thailand, experience higher interception rates, despite robust infrastructures.
During several meetings, the enquiry committee asked many questions from the DPP but surprisingly, no questions from the MoNHSR&C and Dr. Razia Safdar why her department did not address the issue and provincial food safety authorities why they have not addressed the food safety issues in rice units in their jurisdiction, provincial agriculture department why they have not addressed the issue at farmer fields and why they have not taken action against pesticides distributors and dealers that are involved in sale of detected pesticides on rice even when they have not registered such pesticides on rice why they could not stop indiscriminate spray of these restricted pesticides on rice, why the provinces could not ban use of these pesticides in at least core rice growing areas using his regulatory powers after 18th Constitutional amendments. Why committee did not find to discover a person who is responsible for not promulgating food safety regulations on import and export since 1970 after joining CAC. Who is responsible for poor infrastructure and technical manpower at ports of the DPP. Who is responsible for closure of the projects after three months that appointed 100 technical officers (Entomologists) having Master and Ph. D degree to meet technical shortage of the DPP. who is responsible for not conducting promotions in the DPP. who is responsible for not giving advertisement, tests, interviews and selecting eligible candidate against more than 35 technical posts of the DPP. Has Ahmad and Kamran and AL-abbas had infrastructure and manpower to work as commercial fumigator who are behind all complaints against the senior management of the DPP and has conflict of interest with other companies. The companies started their fumigation business in 19’s whereas, present lot of management joined the DPP in 2011-2012. Is fumigation allowed in Pakistan or all countries and IPPC has given its implementing guidelines? Can Pakistani goods without disinfestation with two fumigants prior to export permitted entry in importing countries? Is committee and bureaucrats aware what is cost of treatment in the other countries? How many manufacturers and importers and commercial fumigator registered in USA, China, Australia, Korea, India, etc.? If the committee asked these questions and understood them, then they can give fair solution.
However, it is learnt that Mr. Shahid Khan seemed keen to somehow fix technical officers of the DPP in the food safety related interceptions to make enquiry and charges colourful just to appease his master’s that the committee has unearthed some mega scam and secured their jobs.
The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is, as usual, trying to assert its jurisdiction in the case without understanding the full context and informed the committee that the DPP has not provided records of intercepted consignment, despite the facts the DPP has provided record of 61 consignments whereas, record of 11 consignments remained untraced because Mr. Omer Hammed had not communicated the DPP the corresponding phytosanitary certificates for those rice shipments. Instead, he only provided the names of those exporters. Among them, each one exporter alone sent hundreds of rice consignments to the EU, and without these certificates, it is impossible to trace their specific intercepted consignment among the many shipped by that exporter. How technical officers of the DPP could be responsible for not providing record of such interception to them. Further, such MRL, Aflatoxin interceptions were not communicated by the EU to the DPP. It is learnt from sources within MoNHSR&C that Dr. Razia Safdar from MoNHSR&C has been receiving this interception notification from EU but neither MoNHSR&C had not acted in this regard and Dr. Razia Safdar has left the positions since long, but focal codex point of Pakistan is yet to change at Codex Alimentarius Commission website. Can DPP be responsible for it?
The DPP’s operations—including pesticide imports, plant quarantine, locust surveys and control, and aerial operations—are managed by just 21 qualified personnel and 50 contract technical employees. These workers often go without pay for months and are a stark contrast to staffing numbers in other nations: 520 in Iran, 450 in Korea, and additional personnel in Malaysia and other developed nations. These 71 officers handle plant quarantine tasks at all land terminals, international airports, seaports, and export facilities, despite lacking inspection equipment, designated inspection areas, housing, vehicles, and office spaces.
The committee instead of discussing pesticides detected in the rice consignment and how their use should be restricted in rice zones by educating farmers and making companies and dealers bound not to sale such pesticides on rice, discussed fumigation companies and their used fumigants i.e., aluminum phosphide having no interceptions in rice. One of the premier advisers, ex-bureaucrat turned politician always comes forward to screw up the DPP and the fumigators on the wish of his political master. Why premier don’t call the senior management in the meeting in the presence of his advisers and blue-eyed bureaucrats and listened to them to determine who is on the right side and what are real issues to fix.
In the past, chairman FBR in the past proposed appointment of retired army officer in the DPP succumbed to his own wishes and whims instead of recommending 500 qualified officers in quarantine and foods safety inspections and certification but now under his administration, FBR’s continuous failure to collect taxes and achieve tax collection target and give tax concession to favourites on one or other pretexts does not demand appointment of serving general as head of FBR in place of him. Though, enquiry committee appointed by Mr. Zaffar Hussan, Ex-Secretary and headed by Ex- Additional Secretary, Syed Khalid Ali Gardezi and two Joint Secretaries conducted enquiry on the findings and declared allegations false, frivolous and without any material evidences and has already informed the premier office.
Only robust biosecurity and food safety regulations, technical manpower, physical infrastructure at ports can improve the situation and mitigate food safety related interceptions in EU and other countries and making scapegoat any officer of the DPP without realization ground facts for the contentment of the premier and secure his jobs is quite old concept and prevails in the era of kingdom, dynasties, and monarchies. Today information base era has fully exposed it.
Interceptions of aflatoxin and ensuring compliance with Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for exports to the EU involves various considerations, especially in the context of existing regulatory and operational frameworks.
- Jurisdiction and Mandate: Firstly, it’s important to clarify whether the mandate of the DPP includes or could be expanded to include tasks related to aflatoxin monitoring and managing MRLs. If their primary role is plant protection rather than food safety, this shift might require legislative or regulatory changes.
- Existing Frameworks: In many countries, food safety responsibilities are also distributed to the National Plant Protection organization like Australia, USA, EU and in others, among different agencies e.g., health department, climate change agency, science and technology department. If private actors like SGS and individual exporters are already implementing food safety measures and complying with Codex standards, the DPP’s potential role would need to complement rather than duplicate these efforts.
- Coordination with Provinces: Provincial food safety regulations that operate independently suggest a decentralized system, which could complicate a new centralized role for the DPP. Establishing a coordinating mechanism would be crucial if the DPP is to take on these additional responsibilities. National Biosecurity Technical Committee (NBSC), National Plant Health Committee (NPHC), National Food Safety Committee (NFSC) have been established in August 2024 having representation from all stakeholders including provinces to coordinate with the relevant authorities in the provinces and federation for biosecurity and food safety and development of federal foods safety regulations for forwarding to the government for approval and promulgation and to implement them at port to avoid duplicity but chairman of these committee, of course a bureaucrat have no time so far to convene its meeting but on the other he seems worried to mitigate such interceptions by the DPP without regulations and technical manpower.
- Resources and Capacity: Without a GLP (Good Laboratory Practice) certified lab, the DPP would face significant capacity challenges. Building a lab or partnering with existing labs to perform this work would be necessary. They may need to create partnerships or outsource testing to organizations that have the requisite facilities and expertise.
- Training and Expertise: The interception of aflatoxins and compliance with MRLs require specific expertise and ongoing training. The DPP would need to either hire or develop expertise in these areas, potentially working closely with existing industry and regulatory experts.
- Legal and Operational Frameworks: Legal frameworks would need to align and clearly define the role of the DPP within the context of national and international laws. This could also entail creating a framework for cooperation with industry players (like SGS and exporters) and provincial authorities.
- Stakeholder Engagement: Engaging with all stakeholders—including exporters, provincial food safety authorities, and possibly international partners—will be key to developing a coherent strategy. Their input can ensure that any changes are practical and take current effective practices into account.
The ongoing bureaucratic dominance stifles every effort for institutional improvement and reform, illustrated by the constitution of non-technical committees to investigate complex sector-specific failures. Without involving technical expertise having regulatory long-standing experience of biosecurity and food safety measures instead of involving even senior heads of agriculture research institutions, universities, such efforts do not fully address the underlying issues.
Ultimately, while there are some isolated pockets where the bureaucracy manages to function effectively, the overall landscape is markedly compromised by a legacy of power imbalances and resistance to transparent, accountable governance. Addressing these issues requires substantial reform efforts, including rebalancing power among departments and reducing bureaucratic interference in political processes.
